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Evolutionary Psychology as Public Science and Boundary Work  
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This paper explores the phenomena of public scientific debates, where scientific 
controversies are argued out in public fora such as the mass media, using the case 
of popular evolutionary psychology in the UK of the 1990s.  An earlier 
quantitative analysis of the UK press coverage of the subject (Cassidy, 2005) 
suggested that academics associated with evolutionary psychology had been 
unusually active in the media at that time, particularly in association with the 
publication of popular science books on the subject.   Previous research by Turner 
(1980), Gieryn (1983), and Bucchi (1996) has established the relationship 
between such appeals to the public domain and the establishment of scientific 
legitimacy and academic disciplinary boundaries.  Following this work, I argue 
here that popular science has in this case provided a creative space for scientists, 
outside of the constraints of ordinary academic discourse, allowing them to reach 
across scientific boundaries in order to claim expertise in the study of human 
beings.   
 
Keywords: popular science; public science; boundary work; evolutionary theory; 
evolutionary psychology; publishing; UK media; natural and social sciences. 
 
1.  Introduction: Wrestling In Public 
 
What happens when scientists argue in public? As with families and political alliances, 
on the whole, scientists tend not to wash their dirty linen in public, confining their 
disagreements to the more restricted space of academic fora such as journals and 
conferences.  This leads to what Latour (1987) refers to as the ‘Janus face’ of science, 
where one (internal) side speaks of controversy, and the uncertainty and contingency of 
knowledge, while the other speaks of scientific truth and consensus.  This bifurcation was 
also described by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) as the contrast between ‘contingent’ and 
‘constitutive’ aspects of scientists’ discourse, depending on whether it took place in 
private or public contexts.  Latour argues it is the task of sociologists of science to 
investigate the first of these, in order to understand how ‘science in the making’ works.  
From time to time, scientific controversies spread from the relatively closed and private 
spaces of academic journal articles, conferences and books (with small, professional 
audiences) to the broader public domain of less restricted mass media with far larger and 
less specialized audiences.i  This can often result in the uncertain and often messy 
internal face of science becoming exposed of its own accord. Sometimes, as with the BSE 
crisis in the UK, this is simply because at the time very little is known about the issue at 
hand, but policy or risk concerns demand answers from scientists which do not yet exist, 
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pulling their already existing disagreements into the public domain.  However, there are 
other times when scientists will seek out spaces such as the mass media for their own 
reasons, and use them to advance their scientific arguments and engage in (sometimes 
longstanding) controversies with other scientists.  A particularly famous example of this 
phenomenon, which has now been ongoing in its modern form since at least the mid-
1970s, is that of public scientific debates over evolutionary theory, as seen in the 
following cartoon, referring centrally to the debates between evolutionary biologist 
Richard Dawkins and paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould, which were principally fought 
out in a series of popular science books and articles written by both men. 
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‘The Evolutionary War’, Annals of Improbable Research, Vol.6, No.5 (September / October 2000) 
 
This cartoon comes from a source which could be described as ‘popular science’: perhaps 
best understood as discussions of science in media sources which have a shared and 
specific audience of professional scientists and non-professional readers who are 
interested in science.ii  It uses humor to explore this phenomenon of public scientific 
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controversy, using the metaphor of a commercial, public fight, such as a wrestling match.  
This expresses the ambivalent relationship that many scientists have with the public 
domain, and with those of their number who seek to be engaged in this space, which in 
some ways is quite similar to the ambivalent relationship society has with professional 
combat sports.iii  On the one hand, these scientists are admired and valued for their 
abilities: in writing about and discussing their subject so clearly and articulately; in their 
championing of scientific causes; taking on their opponents; advancing ‘the public 
understanding of science’; and in doing what they do well enough to be enthusiastically 
cheered on by onlookers.  On the other hand, these public arguments could reflect badly 
on science: they can be seen as “squabbles”, full of “hollow rhetoric, pompous quotations 
and insults” (Brooks, 1998; p51).  Just like boxing and wrestling, it seems often the point 
is to win (knock your opponent out) rather than be productive or to learn anything: such 
activities could also be seen as egoistic, macho, over the top, commercialized, violent and 
ultimately pointless.  Public debates of this kind draw attention to the sciences, but it also 
violates many of the implicit rules of scientific conduct, most notably the peer review 
process, but also ideas about scientific discourse being polite, subsuming personal 
opinions and being above commercial influences.  They also, as described above, disrupt 
public images of scientific knowledge as certain, impartial truth, and therefore scientists 
who become involved in them have often faced the disapproval expressed in this cartoon, 
and sometimes this can translate into negative effects upon their careers (see Goodell, 
1977; also Gieryn 1983).  So, when faced with this kind of disapproval, or at the very 
least ridicule from their peers, why do scientists continue to engage in public 
controversy? 
 
Public science and scientific boundaries 
 
A useful place to start in answering such a question can be to look at other cases where 
scientists have worked hard at communicating in the public domain, not only in recent 
years but also further back in the history of science.  Are there any common factors 
involved in such cases, in the tactics and language used by scientists when doing this 
work?  It has been suggested that one purpose of public communication can be to help 
scientists establish and maintain their position as knowledge makers supported by the rest 
of society: 
 
(S)cientists find they must justify their activities to the political powers and other social 
institutions upon whose good will, patronage and cooperation they depend.  The body of 
rhetoric, argument and polemic produced in this process may be termed public science, and 
those who sustain the enterprise may be regarded as public scientists. (Turner, 1980; p589) 
 
Historian of science Frank Turner’s work, on the rhetorical strategies used by Victorian 
and early 20th century scientists, illustrates how they utilized public lectures and popular 
writing in essays and periodicals to argue the case for the legitimacy of science, and  
against its’ detractors, such as the church and the early antivivisection movement.  
Working from a similar perspective, Thomas Gieryn has explored the reasons for 
scientists’ need to do this (Gieryn, 1983; 1985; 1999).  He discusses attempts to find a set 
of criteria that can always distinguish science from ‘not science’, and concludes that they 
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have been largely unsuccessful in describing any characteristics that can apply only to 
science all of the time.  Therefore, scientists need to convince others that the work they 
do is legitimate, their knowledge claims are valid, that scientists should have jurisdiction 
over scientific knowledge, and that they should be supported by the rest of society.  One 
way in which this can be done is to engage in arguments, described as ‘boundary work’, 
which demarcates the difference between ‘proper’, legitimate scientific activities and 
other, less legitimate ones.  However, the places at which such boundaries are drawn will 
constantly change to fit with the needs of the argument being made and the demands of 
society at the time.  For example, in the popular writings of the Victorian physicist John 
Tyndall, science’s empirical, practical benefits for technological advance were 
emphasized when distinguishing it from religion; but its’ theoretical, abstract side was 
stressed when separating science from mechanics and engineering.  
 
For the same reasons that the boundaries between ‘science’ and ‘non-science’ are 
constructed and defended, similar rhetorical strategies can be used to create or bolster 
support for particular approaches or disciplines within the sciences in order to gain 
recognition, funding and support for their work.  This can occur on many levels, from the 
growth of individual labs or new research programs, right up to new disciplines, and such 
arguments can be aimed at other scientists, funding bodies, politicians, or wider publics.  
Depending upon the intended audience, boundary work can appear in many places, 
including academic journals, policy documents, or of course the mass media. Gieryn 
argues that episodes concerning the interests of ‘science’ as a whole are most likely to be 
carried out in the less restricted fora of the public domain (Gieryn, 1983).  However, 
there are times when interdisciplinary boundary work also appears in the public domain, 
as has been explored by sociologist of science Massimiano Bucchi (1996; 1998).  Bucchi 
describes several case studies of scientific communication where scientists have bypassed 
routine methods of popularization (slowly moving from academic to mass media formats 
as knowledge becomes less uncertain), instead reaching out to communicate directly in 
popular media forms.  The most dramatic example of this can be seen when scientists 
choose to announce their findings in press conference before they are published in an 
academic journal, as happened with claims of the discovery of cold fusion (Lewenstein, 
1995; Simon, 2001).  However, it can take other forms, such as when the Alvarez 
asteroid impact theory of the extinction of the dinosaurs was discussed extensively in 
popular forms prior to its establishment as a mainstream theory in paleontology 
(Clemens, 1986).  Bucchi, following Cloitre and Shinn (1985), describes such processes 
collectively as ‘deviation’, and although the term is somewhat problematic, I will 
continue to use it here, though in a descriptive rather than normative sense.  
 
What many of these examples have in common is the participation of members of several 
different scientific disciplines disputing the issue in question.  For example, in the case of 
the Alvarez extinction theory, it was developed by a physics-geology team, but needed to 
be accepted by paleontologists (the usual specialists dealing with dinosaurs) in order to 
establish itself more fully in academia.  In such cases, it can be difficult for scientists in 
one area to reach those in another because of the highly specialized nature of language 
and audiences in academic fora such as journals and conference papers.  Because of their 
broader audiences and everyday language, mass media forms can provide alternative 
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routes for communicating beyond disciplinary boundaries and reaching wider academic 
and other professional audiences (Dolby, 1982; Phillips, 1991).  In addition, the public 
domain can also be utilized as a creative space for scientists, where they can operate 
outside of the usual constraints of academic discourse, speculating freely about their 
work and discussing controversial issues in ways that would not be published in 
academic journals without stronger supporting evidence (Felt, 2000; p30).  However, 
such popular communication has risks as well as benefits, and scientists who engage in it 
can find that they are dismissed as publicity seekers, losing credibility with the very 
specialist audiences they might hope to reach in this way.  Particularly when popular 
discussions result in scientific controversy becoming visible in the public domain, these 
activities can be highly disruptive to the public image of science as certain, reliable, 
knowledge. Therefore, there must be considerable pressure upon scientists before they 
will take this route, and Bucchi argues that a source of this can be contests over, or 
movements around, the established boundaries between scientific disciplines.  This is 
signified by the presence of boundary work in the arguments in use in a controversy, 
which can be directed at a number of levels of scientific boundary, including those drawn 
around ‘science’ as a whole; those created as a new discipline is established; and those 
between pre-existing disciplines, sub-disciplines and even theoretical approaches within a 
single area.  
 
 
Evolutionary Psychology  
Another, more recent example of public scientific controversy around evolution can be 
seen in controversies around evolutionary psychology (EP), which appeared in the UK 
media during the late 1990s and early 2000s.  In some ways, it can perhaps be best 
characterized through some of the claims made by evolutionary psychologists.  These 
were based upon an argument that human psychology has its origins in our evolutionary 
history, and included claims about the evolutionary basis of monogamy, adultery, rape, 
the glass ceiling and what (heterosexual) men and women find attractive in a partner. The 
precise definition of what ‘evolutionary psychology’ was and is itself a controversial 
issue, which I will address in greater detail later in this article: however my broad 
understanding of the term has already been laid out in a previous publication (Cassidy, 
2005).  This paper also described earlier quantitative analysis of the UK press coverage 
of evolutionary psychology, in which it was found that this coverage showed some 
unusual features, compared to routine coverage of the sciences.  Many more academics 
and book authors were writing their own articles about evolutionary psychology, rather 
than appearing as ‘experts’ cited in articles written by journalists.  As time went on, 
coverage of the subject became increasingly evaluative and less accepting of the claims 
made by evolutionary psychologists, to the point where this coverage developed into a 
public scientific debate.  In addition, a close association was found between the 
publications of several popular science books on evolutionary psychology, and the levels 
of coverage of the subject.  Prior to the appearance of the first popular book to mention 
evolutionary psychology, science writer Robert Wright’s (1994) The Moral Animal, the 
term ‘evolutionary psychology’ was not in use in the UK press at all.  However, 
following the book’s US publication, press coverage of evolutionary psychology and of 
the book’s author rose and fell together throughout the next two years.  A similar effect 
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was found in 1998 and 1999, with the publication of Steven Pinker’s How the Mind 
Works (1998), an evolutionary psychology book which was covered widely in the press 
and achieved high sales figures.  Several of these books have relatively high citation rates 
in academic journals, going into the hundreds in some cases.iv  Finally, it was also found 
that usage of the phrase ‘evolutionary psychology’ in academic journal articles rose 
sharply after the main period of UK press coverage of the subject, which peaked in the 
year 2000.  
 
However, because this analysis relied solely upon quantitative methods and data, the 
strength of claims that can be made based upon it is limited.  A mixed methodology 
research design (Brewer and Hunter, 1989) was therefore employed, in which I also 
carried out qualitative analysis of the press and other media coverage of evolutionary 
psychology; and of a series of semi-structured interviews carried out with academics and 
media professionals involved with the controversy.  A total of 21 people were 
interviewed between 1999 and 2002, and participants were approached through a 
combination of their visibility in the media, personal contacts and ‘snowball’ strategies.v 
Due to the public profile of many of these people, and the ‘live’ and frequently heated 
nature of the controversy, these interviews were carried out under conditions of 
anonymity, despite the fact that identifying their precise position in the controversy could 
strengthen the analysis.  Furthermore, is worthwhile emphasizing that, in line with much 
research carried out in the broad area of science and technology studies, I have attempted 
to carry out as close to a ‘symmetrical’ analysis of this controversy as is possible (Bloor, 
1991), i.e. to address the underlying strategies and interests of all participants in the 
debate.  This is a methodological approach which I feel is important to attempt, 
particularly considering the tendency of this kind of research to become incorporated into 
one of the sides in a live controversy (Ashmore and Richards, 1996); the heated nature of 
evolutionary psychology debates; and the participation of my own research fields in some 
aspects of the controversy.vi  
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2.   Popular Evolutionary Psychology  
 
One of the most striking features of popular evolutionary psychology in the UK was the 
way in which it quickly developed into a controversy, along the lines of and blurring into 
previous controversies such as the above mentioned Dawkins-Gould disputes.  An 
important aspect of this was the flexible and direct way in which the scientists and other 
actors involved in the controversy communicated their arguments.  As well as providing 
interviews and quotes for journalists and press officers to write about, academics 
involved in the evolutionary psychology debate engaged in many more ‘direct’ forms of 
communication, such as writing press and media articles themselves, appearing on TV 
and radio discussion programs, giving public lectures and writing popular science books.  
In addition, journalists, science writers and other commentators became involved, with 
some actors functioning as ‘experts’ in the media alongside the academics.   
 
Although not often thought of as part of the ‘mass media’, I would argue that popular 
books have often had important roles to play in the discussion of science in the public 
domain, despite the relative lack of attention that has been paid to them in research on 
science communication.  In particular, such publishing has been central to the public 
discussion of evolutionary psychology ideas, with around 25 popular books being 
published in the UK on the subject, broadly defined, from 1991-2001.vii  These continue a 
longstanding tradition of popular writing in evolutionary thought, including Darwin’s 
Origin of Species (1859), a book written for and read by other learned men as well as the 
broader educated public.  The Origin was written at a time when there was much less of a 
division between so-called ‘popular’ and ‘technical’ writing about science.  As science 
became increasingly professional and institutionalized through the 20th century, it became 
more normal for most scientists to only communicate with one another in technical 
journals while only a few, usually senior, ‘visible scientists’ wrote books specifically 
intended for wider publics (Goodell, 1977).  However, particularly in the evolutionary 
arena, popular writing continued to play important roles, with the popular work of 
scientists such as Julian Huxley, JBS Haldane, Ernst Mayr and Konrad Lorenz.  Such 
discussions of evolution took on a more modern form during the Sociobiologyviii 
controversy in the mid 1970s, precipitated by the publication of two popular books – E.O. 
Wilson’s Sociobiology (1975) and Richard Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene (1976), and 
continued to be discussed at a popular level, largely but not exclusively through writers 
such as Dawkins and Gould, through the rest of the 1980s. 
 
During the late 1980s and 1990s, something happened to make popular science 
publishing into a much more prominent, and profitable enterprise than it had been for 
many years, as described here by a publishing editor working in the area at the time. 
When Stephen Hawking’s A Brief History of Time first appeared (in 1988) anyone familiar 
with Weinberg’s book [Steven Weinberg’s The First Three Minutes] would probably have 
felt reasonably safe in predicting a modest sales performance at least: like the earlier book: it 
had a wonderful title, a straightforward writing style, and an author who was a leading light 
in the field. (Rodgers, 1992; p231)  
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What happened instead was that Hawking’s book went on to become, at the time, the 
biggest selling popular science book ever, taking its publishers entirely by surprise and 
propelling the author to fame and iconic status.  Although the subsequent boom in 
popular science publishing cannot be ascribed solely to this phenomenon, with scientific 
institutions, scientists, publishers and literary agents such as John Brockmanix all playing 
their part, it is certainly true that after this period many more popular books were 
published, prominently marketed and became bestsellers in the UK.  The Aventis 
(formally Rhone-Poulenc) prize for science books has now been for some years a high 
profile event coveted by authors and publishers and widely covered in the rest of the 
media.  This prize was set up in 1989, the year after the publication of Hawking’s book, 
as was the Edinburgh International Science Festival, a well attended public festival where 
many popular authors give talks about their work, a pattern now followed by the 
Cheltenham Festival of Science, now in its fourth year.  This pattern of trends in 
publishing is not unusual: another, more recent example in fiction can be seen in so called 
‘chick-lit’, following the success of Helen Fielding’s Bridget Jones’ Diary (1996). 
However, the strength of the pop science boom was such that an entire new mass market 
for publishing was opened up, complete with its own trends within the genre.x  
 
During the 1990s, there was such a trend for biological, evolutionary and brain books, 
which evolutionary psychology fitted neatly into and benefited from, as a freelance 
journalist describes here, discussing a conversation that he had had with a UK publisher 
at that time: 
“My god, something exciting’s happening in science, this stuff about genetics, that sort of 
science, the Genome Project, and Richard Dawkins sells a lot of books, and we ought to be 
up to speed with this.”(R9 - freelance generalist journalist) 
 
Although, as I have described, Dawkins has been a successful popular author since the 
1970s, he became even more popular at this time, as the republication of The Selfish 
Gene as a ‘popular science classic’ in 1989 attests.  Furthermore, there was also a great 
deal of popular discussion and claims made about ‘the new genetics’ leading up to and 
including the publication of the first draft of the Human Genome Project in the year 2000, 
and evolutionary psychology was seen in popular science circles as closely linked to 
these movements. Robert Wright’s The Moral Animal introduced the term ‘evolutionary 
psychology’ into public discussion in the UK in 1994, there were several other books 
published over this period which drew strongly upon, or were closely linked with 
evolutionary psychology arguments.  Philosopher of science Helena Cronin’s history of 
altruism and sexual selection, The Ant and the Peacock was published in 1992, while the 
science writer Matt Ridley published evolutionary books in 1994 (The Red Queen, about 
the evolution of sex) and 1996 (The Origins of Virtue, on altruism).  Finally, cognitive 
psychologist Steven Pinker and primatologist Robin Dunbar both wrote on the evolution 
of language; respectively in 1994 (The Language Instinct) and 1996 (Grooming, Gossip 
and the Evolution of Language).  It was also at this time that press usage of ‘evolutionary 
psychology’ and wider discussion of evolutionary themes started to take off.   
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Part of the UK popular science boom included an increased popularity of events where 
scientists give talks, lectures, or debate with one other in front of public audiences.  Such 
activities are not new, and public lectures have been held in this country by organizations 
such as the Royal Institution and British Association since the 19th century.  However, 
such events achieved a new frequency and popularity in the 1990s, with the Edinburgh 
International Science Festival and many other smaller events appearing at this time.  Such 
events dovetail neatly with, and were frequently been sponsored by, popular science 
publishers, and authors with new books out are often to be found speaking at them. 
Evolutionary psychologists and their opponents participated fully in this movement, and 
in fact contributed to it via the Darwin@LSE program.  Darwin@LSE was both a 
research group based at the London School of Economics’ Centre for the Philosophy of 
Natural and Social Science; and a series of public lectures organized by a group of 
academics between 1995 and 1998.xi  The lectures were broadly on the theme of 
Darwinism, and many of them were given by evolutionary psychologists and their allies.  
Members of Darwin@LSE themselves engaged in popular work, both through books and 
other media. The program also produced its own series of popular science books, 
Darwinism Today, published by Weidenfeld and Nicholson, and co-operated closely with 
several publishers, in particular by timing the seminars to coincide with authors’ book 
publications and other media appearances, but also more directly by including publisher’s 
publicity material with that sent out advertising ‘Darwin lectures’.xii  
 
The program also networked closely with other media such as newspapers and radio, 
maintaining a mailing list for promoting the seminars to journalists and other interested 
parties. Many of the media professionals I spoke with reported receiving material from 
them: this was the response when I asked what this journalist knew about the program: 
 
In the sense that I'm informed of it any time anything happens, and X rings up and badgers 
me from time to time, and certainly is a wonderful leg biter, that is whenever she sees the 
press, she bites their legs, and says, “Why don't you come to my lecture-ettes”.  
(R17 - science journalist, broadsheet press)  
 
The lectures were very well attended, not only by members of the public, but also 
journalists, columnists, novelists, publishers, and other figures involved in the London 
media and intellectual circuit. They took place over the same early period described 
above, where evolutionary psychology was establishing itself, as a label and a set of 
ideas, in the public domain of the UK 
In many ways, what was the most important aspect of Darwin@LSE was that it transformed 
EP from being a fairly backwater science, or discipline, or approach, to something at the 
forefront of the public mind.  In ‘96, ‘97 it was one of the hottest tickets to have, you’d go 
there and you find everybody from John Maynard Smith to Jonathan Miller to Ian McEwan to 
Melvyn Bragg.   So yes, in terms of bringing it to public consciousness, or I suppose more 
importantly of bringing it to the consciousness of the media and of policy makers I think it 
was crucially important.  
(R12 – popular author, freelance science journalist) 
 
The next major development came in early 1998, with the publication of Steven Pinker’s 
How the Mind Works, an explicit argument for the evolutionary psychology approach to 
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studying humans.  How the Mind Works had a highly professional publicity campaign, 
and received a phenomenal amount of coverage in the UK media as a whole.  As well as 
being reviewed in most of the daily newspapers (during the week and in Saturday 
editions), Sunday newspapers and news magazines, this coverage also included extracts 
and many other articles and comment pieces about both book and author.  Steven Pinker 
came to Britain for the publication of the book, and conducted many interviews, book 
signings, radio appearances and public lectures, including at Darwin@LSE.  This 
extensive coverage was reflected in the close association between press mentions of 
Steven Pinker and of evolutionary psychology throughout 1998 and much of 1999, a 
period when coverage of the subject became much more widespread than before 
(Cassidy, 2005).  After the spring of 1998, the Darwin@LSE lecture series closed, and 
although members of the group are still resident at the LSE, they became very much less 
active in the public domain.xiii  
 
During 1999 and 2000, a number of books appeared which changed the tenor of public 
discussions about evolutionary psychology from a largely positive, even celebratory 
atmosphere to a distinctly more evaluative one.  These books were written by science 
writers and academics from a wider range of disciplinary backgrounds, and displayed an 
equally broad spread of responses to the claims of evolutionary psychology, ranging from 
broadly allied positions, through criticisms on various grounds, to strongly opposed 
arguments against EP.  There was a range of responses from feminists during 1999, 
including US science journalist Natalie Angier’s Woman: An Intimate Geography;  
feminist psychologist Lynne Segal’s Why Feminism?; and feminist sociobiologist Sarah 
Blaffer Hrdy’s Mother Nature.  A selection of other books published at this time 
addressing evolutionary psychology included work by geneticist Steve Jones (Almost 
Like A Whale: The Origin of Species Updated, 1999); ethologists Patrick Bateson 
(Design For A Life, 1999) and Tim Birkhead (Promiscuity, 2000); and journalist Andrew 
Brown (The Darwin Wars, 1999).  During this period, evolutionary psychology books 
also continued to appear, such as Icon Books’ comic style Introducing Evolutionary 
Psychology, by Dylan Evans and Oscar Zarante (1999) and Geoffrey Miller’s The Mating 
Mind (2000), but the diversity of positions now on display in the public domain meant 
that the overall tone of public discussion of EP had now shifted decisively towards that of 
a public debate, with much of the press coverage appearing in a ‘controversy’ framing.  
 
One of the most overt and prominent critiques of evolutionary psychology which 
appeared at this time was the collection Alas Poor Darwin: Arguments Against 
Evolutionary Psychology, published in June 2000 and edited by the feminist sociologist 
Hilary Rose and the neurobiologist Steven Rose, in which academics from the social 
sciences, biology, psychology and philosophy wrote essays on the subject (Rose and 
Rose, 2000). One of the most important impacts of Alas Poor Darwin was the way in 
which it provided an ‘event’ upon which to hang press and other media coverage about 
evolutionary psychology.xiv  This was strongly facilitated by the activities of the editors 
themselves, who had been involved in previous controversies in the UK about 
sociobiology, and are longstanding critics of political and social aspects of the sciences.  
Working separately and in concert, they made themselves visible in the media through 
writing articles, including extracts of the book itself, book reviews, public lectures and 
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debates and appearing in other media, such as radio discussion programs, to critique and 
argue against evolutionary psychology positions.  Their work, and the appearance of the 
book itself, also stimulated further coverage, discussion and commentary.  Just as 
Darwin@LSE, and the books and authors associated with it, had brought attention to EP 
in the first place, the Roses’ book and others like it provided a focus and resource for 
other actors, especially lay commentators, to engage with and challenge the claims made 
by evolutionary psychologists.   
 
Such patterns of media intervention and visibility occurred, to a greater or lesser extent, 
with all of the popular books under discussion in this paper, and indeed in terms of 
audience figures, it could be argued that such media coverage is at least as important, and 
possibly more so than the content of the books themselves, because the audiences for 
press discussions are so much higher.  These interactions are crucially important in 
understanding media coverage of evolutionary psychology, as well as the broader cultural 
impacts of today’s popular science industry. 
 
If it’s a big book, you will get book proofs ideally five to six months ahead, and those will go 
to magazines and you will try and pin down the cornerstones of your campaign, like 
serialization, color magazines and big interviews.  […] Plus, you’re getting out a sort of word 
of mouth campaign, so you send it to major reviewers and readers, who you then get to start 
reading and talking about it, and you probably have anywhere between fifty and one hundred 
people to contact.  […] You’re basically then looking at the book, taking a million notes, 
finding as many angles as you can, really of people who would like to review it and why, and 
of how many ‘science’ stories you can squeeze out of it for the science pages, how many 
‘social’ stories can be spun off, implications of the science into the other pages beyond the 
science pages, features, arts, finance, business, columns, news, a day in the life of, if you 
have a strange life, personal details can be of interest, you use every angle you can, think it 
through and ideally you sell each angle to a different spot, so really maximizing your 
coverage as far as possible. (R11 - popular science PR) 
 
I have quoted this interviewee at length to give an insight into how media campaigns 
surrounding modern popular science (and other) books are carried out.  This co-operation 
between publishers and other media forms, particularly the broadsheet press and radio, 
are of course based in longstanding routines surrounding the publication and promotion 
of new books, and as such long predate the popular science boom.  As well as publishers 
gaining exposure and publicity for their books, other media, such as newspapers, are 
quite happy to participate with such arrangements because it provides them with reliable, 
regular, predictable and frequently interesting sources of material about which to write.  
In the case of evolutionary psychology, it became apparent that the (often academic) 
authors of popular books were tapping into these routines, particularly via routes such as 
Darwin@LSE, in order to make their argument in the public domain, continuing the 
pattern of mutual co-option to the benefit of all concerned. This is highlighted by the 
quantitative finding that higher levels of academics were writing directly in the press 
compared to a similar science subject at the time (Cassidy, 2005), and many of my 
interviewees referred to the ‘popular’ or ‘public’ debate over evolutionary psychology. 
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Although the Darwin@LSE events only ran for a few short years, largely at a time before 
the term ‘evolutionary psychology’ had gained wider currency in the UK public domain, 
it was clear from my interviewees that the intervention of this group provided a crucial 
‘push’ for evolutionary psychology to enter into the public domain of the UK during the 
1990s, intimately bound up with the publication of popular science books on the subject.  
So why did so many academics make such concerted efforts to present their arguments 
about evolutionary psychology in this way, rather than solely in the academic literature of 
the time?  Although most of my interviewees felt that it was important for them to write 
popular science for what could broadly be termed ‘democratic’ reasons (sharing 
knowledge; furthering the ‘public understanding’ of science; providing feedback to 
society on the work they do; contributing to public debates over socio/political issues), 
these kinds of reasons cannot by themselves explain why so many more academics 
directly contributed to popular discussions about EP.  Similarly, it could be argued that 
that the subject matter of evolutionary psychology (human psychology and relationships) 
is particularly appealing to media and publics alike, and that academics were simply 
responding to a demand for popular science in this area.  Again, I believe that this may 
well be true, and plan to explore this issue in depth at a later date, but this cannot be the 
whole story: if it was then there would be many other kinds of social scientists producing 
popular material than there currently are.  Instead, I will here focus upon broader 
institutional reasons why these academics turned to the public domain in this case, 
looking at the academic politics at work in and around evolutionary psychology. 
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3.  The ‘disciplinary ecology’ of evolutionary psychology 
 
In the history and sociology of science, there have been many attempts at mapping out 
scientific disciplines, and the relationships between them, in order to better understand 
how the sciences work.  However, as Thomas Gieryn’s (1999) work has described, such 
enterprises have almost inevitably become incorporated into the processes of discipline 
building, in which mapping; and the associated practice of boundary work, play 
important rhetorical roles in creating such relationships.  Inevitably, cartographers of 
science must occupy a particular disciplinary position themselves, and so their location 
will affect the way in which they draw out a map of the sciences.  Furthermore, maps are 
designed to represent a relatively static situation, such as a landscape, and so struggle to 
cope with the relatively fast pace of change as the sciences develop.  Gieryn suggests that 
perhaps a more productive way of thinking about academic science, and the complex of 
disciplines which make it up, can be through the use of an ecological metaphor.  In a 
biological ecosystem, animals, plants and the environment are understood to coexist 
within an interconnected system in which each organism has developed a particular role, 
or niche from which it interacts with the rest of the system.  He argues that such a 
metaphor can be extended as an aid in understanding society as a large dynamic system 
of social groups and actors, of which academia and science are a fundamental part, with 
their own internal ‘ecology’ comprised of professional disciplines:xv 
 
But science has not always had its niche, nor are the boundaries of its present niche 
permanent.  The intellectual ecosystem has with time been carved up into ‘separate’ 
institutional and professional niches through continuing processes of boundary work designed 
to achieve an apparent differentiation of goals, methods, capabilities and substantive 
expertise. (Gieryn, 1983; p783)  
 
Such a move has a number of advantages, but most fundamentally, an ecology is a 
dynamic system which changes over time, leading to an understanding of disciplinary 
relationships, and of society itself, as similarly dynamic.  This acknowledges the 
importance of historical factors contributing to the present situation, as well as the 
likeliness of future change.  The idea that today’s sciences have been and continue to be 
shaped by their interactions with each other and the rest of society is also an important 
one, which has been developed further by researchers in the history and sociology of 
science using social worlds theory in their work (see, e.g., Clarke, 1990; 1998; Star and 
Griessemer, 1989).  Social worlds are groups of people who work together to achieve a 
particular goal or goals, and produce common modes of practice in doing so.  As such, 
the sciences can be seen as social worlds, and their mutual interactions produce and 
reproduce the disciplinary structures seen in modern science.  An ecological (and social 
worlds) view of the sciences has one further advantage: it can be used to understand the 
multiple levels of interaction between scientific disciplines, sub-disciplines and research 
approaches within science, as well as the broader interactions between science and the 
rest of society at the same time.  
 
Following in this tradition, I will now explore some of the ways in which evolutionary 
psychology challenged, destabilized, subverted, constituted and reinforced the established 
boundaries within and around the current social worlds of those disciplines concerned 
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with studying human behavior, relationships, society and cultures.  I will also use Harry 
Collins’ concept of the ‘core set’ (the central, often very small group of scientists directly 
involved in experimentation and theorisation about a particular scientific issue) to 
illustrate how these boundaries exist in a series of layers radiating out from those 
contested around evolutionary psychology itself (Collins, 1985; Collins and Evans, 
2002).  These will be illustrated through examples of the boundary work performed 
around popular evolutionary psychology, in interviews with participants in the debate, as 
well as media coverage of the subject.  
 
 
Evolutionary Psychology: the core-set 
 
When conducting interviews for this research, I quickly found that asking actors to give a 
definition of evolutionary psychology was a simple and rather revealing way of 
beginning, providing a good way of engaging people whilst breaking the ice in a new 
encounter. I rapidly found that many people struggled with their answers, and sometimes 
actively resisted my attempts to find out what they thought ‘evolutionary psychology’ 
meant. The answers I got back were enormously varied, as indeed are the descriptions 
and definitions of evolutionary psychology that have appeared in print.  In fact, as this 
answer suggests, it may be this very quality which has helped evolutionary psychology in 
gaining currency in both popular and academic discussions of the subject. 
 
What it [evolutionary psychology] is actually, it is the attempt to put forward evolved 
adaptations in the human mind […] I think in pop terms, I mean my own rough… Like any 
catchphrase like that, it’s also an aspiration, it’s a research program, it’s a, you know, it’s 
practically got a tool for picking things out of horses hooves! (R1 – popular author and 
freelance science journalist) 
 
Of course, there is a certain paradox in attempting a description of evolutionary 
psychology in a article analyzing the arguments and rhetorical devices used in just such 
definitions. Like Gieryn’s cartographers of science, I have an inescapable, albeit complex 
location in these debates, which will in turn affect my analysis.xvi  However, my 
description of these relationships should be understood as not only partial, but also as a 
snapshot of a dynamic and rapidly changing situation.  Also, rather than trying to define 
the boundaries of ‘evolutionary psychology’, I would instead like to describe my 
understanding of the ‘core-set’ of actors, locations and concepts associated with the 
subject, which I have done by tracing them back to the origins of the term itself.  
 
The first people to write about evolutionary psychology, and the originators of the label 
in the late 1980s were a small group of North American cognitive and social 
psychologists and anthropologists.  This core group included two central research teams: 
psychologist Leda Cosmides and anthropologist John Tooby; and Canadian psychologists 
Martin Daly and Margo Wilson; as well as social psychologist David Buss; cognitive 
psychologist and linguist Steven Pinker; and anthropologist Donald Symons, who was 
involved with sociobiology since the late 1970s.   In the wake of this group, many other 
academics have adopted their ideas, based in a wider range of disciplines: still in 
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psychology and anthropology, but also in philosophy, economics, law, management and 
advertising.  This second group is also more geographically distributed with a strong 
presence in the UK as well as US, although with far fewer representatives outside of the 
Anglo-American world.  Examples of UK core actors include the members of the original 
Darwin@LSE group such as Helena Cronin, Geoffrey Miller and Dylan Evans, as well as 
philosophers such as Janet Radcliffe Richards.  I would argue that this second group has 
also included prominent science writers such as Robert Wright and Matt Ridley, who 
have been very active in contributing to and promoting evolutionary psychology through 
their books and writing in the UK media. Today, the most important academic society for 
evolutionary psychology is the Human Behavior and Evolution Society (HBES): its 
journal Evolution and Human Behavior has been one of the central academic sites for 
publication on the subject.xvii  Other important journals include Behavioural and Brain 
Sciences, and Human Nature: an Interdisciplinary Biosocial Perspective.   
    
So what do evolutionary psychologists themselves say when they are trying to define 
what they do? The following statement comes from what one of my interviewees 
described as a ‘manifesto’ for evolutionary psychology, written by Leda Cosmides and 
John Tooby, arguably the originators of the term, and authors of the first academic papers 
to use it.   
Evolutionary psychology is an approach to psychology, in which knowledge and principles 
from evolutionary biology are put to use in research on the structure of the human mind.  It is 
not an area of study, like vision, reasoning, or social behavior.  It is a way of thinking about 
psychology that can be applied to any topic within it. (Cosmides and Tooby, 1997; p1) 
 
Although science writer Robert Wright described EP in his book The Moral Animal 
(1994) as a ‘new science’, Cosmides and Tooby avoid such concrete definitions, and 
often resist characterization of evolutionary psychology as a discrete discipline.  In other 
places, they and others have referred to it as a ‘new paradigm’, either for psychology or 
the social sciences more widely (e.g. Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Buss, 1995). 
The following image comes from an online resource of essays about the philosophy of 
mind, which uses cartoons as a way of highlighting the central concepts of each essay.  In 
this case, the cartoonist reinforces one of the most central concepts and definitions given 
by the proponents of evolutionary psychology.  This, as suggested by the name itself, is 
that evolutionary psychology is ‘the combination of two sciences – evolutionary biology 
and cognitive psychology’ (Evans and Zarante, 1999; p 3) or as indicated here, what 
happens when Darwin and ‘the brain’ get together. 
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Image by Enrico Biondi, taken from essay, ‘Evolutionary Psychology’ on the website A Field Guide to 
the Philosophy of Mind xviii  
 
Such initial definitions are often quite broad, but closer examination reveals several 
theoretical ideas which distinguish evolutionary psychology from other evolutionary 
approaches to humans.  The second image comes from a popular science website, 
Evolution’s Voyage, and illustrates some other defining characteristics of evolutionary 
psychology ideas.   
 
 
Image by Alex Hughes, taken from, ‘What is Evolutionary Psychology?’ on the website Evolution’s 
Voyage xix 
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Again, the image of the exposed brain is important as a symbol of the object of study of 
cognitive psychology.  Cognitive psychology has traditionally been an area of 
psychology strongly aligned towards the natural sciences, often using models of the mind 
based on computing metaphors and allied with neuroscience, computer science and 
artificial intelligence.  As with the previous image, the exposed brain represents the mind 
and the two are seen as synonymous, reflecting the materialist stance of cognitive 
psychology.  The circles labeled ‘laughter’, ‘language’, ‘sexual attraction’ and so on 
indicate a specific model of the mind held by evolutionary psychologists: massive 
modularity.  The massive modularity thesis sees the mind as made up of many 
independent units, each of which handles a specific task, such as language.  This model 
was developed out of earlier ideas about modularity developed in cognitive psychology 
(Fodor, 1983), but massive modularity is still controversial within that discipline (e.g. 
Fodor, 2000).  The representation of these modules is interesting, with the grey color and 
three dimensional shapes recalling the exposed physical brain, but the labeled circles on 
the brain’s surface also recalls the 19th century study of phrenology, which evolutionary 
psychologists often claim as a precursor to their own science (see, e.g., Evans & Zarante, 
1999; p 37).xx  The image also looks to be one of a monkey, thereby symbolizing human 
origins and links with other animals, as well as evolutionary psychology’s connections 
with biology through evolutionary theory.  The addition of Darwinism brings 
evolutionary psychologists further towards the natural sciences, thus lending them the 
relatively greater epistemological authority of biology.   Another important concept is the 
idea that ‘our modern skulls house a Stone Age mind’ – that our minds are adapted for an 
ancestral environment and haven’t changed since (though the environment has), 
sometimes paraphrased as ‘caveman psychology’ (Cosmides and Tooby, 1997).   Finally, 
evolutionary psychologists also stress their interest in the universal features of human 
psychology and behavior, rather than in differences between groups of people, such as 
ethnic groups, an important distinction I will return to later. 
 
‘Broad’ and ‘narrow’ evolutionary psychology  
 
However, these definitions of evolutionary psychology as laid out by its proponents in the 
US and UK, are frequently contested by other actors with an interest in the area. As well 
as the core evolutionary psychologists, in the UK there are a broader spread of academics 
exist who, like evolutionary psychologists, use evolutionary theory in their work and 
study human beings, but do so using a broader variety of theoretical models and 
empirical methodologies.  These researchers also come from a different grouping of 
academic disciplines, ones more traditionally associated with evolutionary studies, such 
as neurobiology, evolutionary biology, physical and paleo anthropology, behavioral 
genetics, paleontology, ethology (the study of animal behavior), and primatology.  In 
general, these disciplines are better established in academia than evolutionary 
psychology, but are also the origin of many of the theoretical concepts currently in use by 
evolutionary psychologists.  On the whole, these researchers have in common an 
orientation, location or history leaning towards the biological natural sciences, and to the 
theoretical approaches of sociobiology and behavioral ecology.  The complexity of the 
situation is such that I can only give here a generalized sense of these relationships, but it 
is also one in which the notion of a disciplinary ecology can certainly be applied, with the 
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associated ideas of constant change and interaction between the actors and groupings 
concerned.  
 
The term ‘sociobiology’ was coined in 1975 by the American entomologist E.O. Wilson 
in his book Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, in which he described his vision of how to 
apply the concepts of evolutionary biology to the study of behavior.  As the title suggests, 
the book brought together empirical research on animal behavior whilst showing how 
those findings were consistent with theoretical ideas in evolutionary biology.  It was his 
final chapter, in which Wilson extended these arguments to humans, where the trouble 
started.  The Sociobiology debate, largely sustained from the mid 1970s until the late 
1980s, had many features in common with 1990s controversy over evolutionary 
psychology.  It was launched and sustained through a number of semi-popular books and 
‘public’ events; involved protracted, bitter and public controversy between academics 
from a range of disciplines; and was concerned with contemporary political issues, as 
well as the boundary between the natural and social sciences.  A full discussion of the 
Sociobiology controversy is far beyond the remit of this paper; however, it is important 
for understanding the current situation to take this previous episode into account, as well 
as to understand that sociobiology did not begin, end or exclusively comprise the writings 
of E. O. Wilson.  In parallel and prior to the American work of Wilson and his 
colleagues, the British tradition of ethology (animal behavior) research had developed 
alongside theoretical evolutionary biology to create something very like Wilson’s 
Sociobiology: the more UK based tradition of behavioral ecology.  In 1976, the then 
ethologist Richard Dawkins published the classic work of popular science, The Selfish 
Gene, describing a view of evolution as operating at the level of individual genes, rather 
than organisms, populations or species.  The traditions represented by Wilson and 
Dawkins were interrelated from the start and rapidly moved together to strongly influence 
many areas of biology, but particularly ‘whole organism’ disciplines, such as population 
biology and studies of animal behavior.  This means that although public disputes over 
Sociobiology and humans have long since subsided, in academia there are many 
scientists who would still describe themselves as sociobiologists or behavioral ecologists 
(see Brown, 1999 and Segerstrale, 2000, for further discussions of this period).   
 
In her research on the history of primatology, Amanda Rees argues that primatologists 
adopted sociobiology in the 1970s and 1980s because it provided a strong theoretical 
framework for a field of study that had previously worked largely within an empirical, 
descriptive ‘natural history’ tradition (Rees, 2001a; 2001b).  This theoretical framework 
helped to bring primatology further towards the natural sciences and reinforced its status 
as ‘science’, rather than the atheoretical, semi-amateur Victorian tradition of natural 
history. This holds for not only primatology, but also for studies of animal behavior in 
general, as described here by one of Rees’ informants: 
Sociobiology, or what can be spoken of, “more broadly under the label of behavioural 
ecology, what it boils down to is asking not just the old question of what do the animals do 
but in addition, asking the question, ‘If they are well adapted, what should they be doing and 
how close does the one match the other?’ This is the kind of thinking that has really 
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revolutionised animal behaviour in general, not just primate field studies.” (Rees, 2001a; 
p233)   
 
It seems more than possible that psychologists, who tend to work in one of a half-dozen 
or more competing schools of psychological thought, may feel a similar need for unity 
and a more coherent theoretical underpinning to their work (e.g. Richards, 2002). These 
comments also highlight the ambiguity felt by many academics around the term 
‘sociobiology’, with ‘behavioral ecology’ sometimes being adopted as an alternative 
name for the area.  This is particularly common amongst UK academics, where the 
behavioral ecology tradition developed, but the boundary between the two is quite 
flexible, as I found when exploring it with my interviewees.  Academics identifying 
closely with evolutionary psychology seemed aware of the term ‘behavioral ecology’, but 
were very unclear on what it might mean.  Some felt that the two were synonymous, or 
that it was pointless trying to make such distinctions, whilst others (tending towards the 
ethology tradition) seemed much keener to make a strong distinction between the two.  
At the same time, there were others who quite pragmatically identified the ‘behavioral 
ecology’ label as a tactic used to avoid the public notoriety or political connotations of 
sociobiology, or to distance a British research tradition from a North American one.   
 
So when developing their arguments, evolutionary psychologists had to emphasize the 
newness of their approach, and its difference from the many others in this crowded arena.  
One of the key ways in which this was done was to stress the importance of (human) 
psychology in evolutionary psychology, as compared with the sociobiology / ethology 
tradition of studying animal and human behavior, hence the emphasis on the human 
mind/brain in the above definitions.  This movement between ‘general’ and ‘specific’ 
definitions of evolutionary psychology is well illustrated in this comment from a ‘core’ 
EP academic and popular author:  
It’s just Darwinian theory applied to human beings, that’s all, just as simple as that.  I think 
the one thing I would add, is that there are so many wrong ways of applying it in general to 
any species, and to any problem, but in particular people seem to find even more wrong ways 
of doing it when you get to humans.  But this, the key that this approach has developed and is 
obviously right, is not to try to explain human behavior as the adaptations, but to look at the 
adaptations in the mental and physical adaptations that natural selection has laid down, and 
then those generate forms of behavior, and different behavior under different conditions, and 
one of the problems is to look at, given this mental inheritance and psychological inheritance, 
under what sorts of conditions might you expect what to occur.  It’s just being Darwinian, at 
humans. (R3 – academic, evolutionary psychology; popular author) 
 
This response also emphasizes the contributions of cognitive psychology to evolutionary 
psychology, important in the theoretical concept of massive modularity, and some of the 
methodological approaches used in EP research.  Part of the reason for this distancing can 
be seen in the arguments of opponents of evolutionary psychology, who tend to describe 
it as part of a much larger continuum of evolutionary approaches to studying humans, as 
seen here: 
Look, I mean I date the whole recent, sort of the whole history of the current interest in 
sociobiology, evolutionary psychology right back through the 1970s.  Really I would date its 
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starting point to when Jensen wrote his paper on IQ, back in 1969. (R18 - academic author, 
neurobiology) 
 
This view of evolutionary psychology, as continuous with previous ‘biological’ 
approaches to humans, serves obvious rhetorical purposes, by linking it with more 
politically conservative traditions such as race-IQ theory, social Darwinism and eugenics 
(see, e.g., Dusek, 1999; Rose and Rose, 2000 for similar views).  
 
However, the boundary between sociobiology and evolutionary psychology was also 
regarded as weak or unimportant by other academics involved in evolutionary studies, 
who were not direct opponents of evolutionary psychology.  For example, in this 
interview with Richard Dawkins, carried out by the evolutionist, Darwin@LSE’s online 
magazine,xxi Dawkins is skeptical of evolutionary psychology’s claims to novelty:  
the evolutionist:    Surely there’s quite a difference between the way evolutionary theory is 
used in evolutionary psychology, than the kind used in the less 
sophisticated areas of sociobiology? 
Dawkins:  So you say; it’s not obvious to me.  Sounds like a new name for the same 
subject.  What do you think is the difference? 
the evolutionist:  The main difference is surely the emphasis on psychology… (Curry, 1997) 
 
Dawkins’ view was reflected by those of many of the people I spoke to with a 
longstanding research involvement with evolution and humans: that evolutionary 
psychology is basically the same thing as sociobiology. Others were skeptical of the need 
for this kind of labeling, questioning the utility of ‘marching under banners’, or using 
‘cheap slogans’.  The following comment, from an academic involved in sociobiological 
research for many years, reflects this ambivalence: 
I was an evolutionary psychologist before the word had been invented […] and I think I didn't 
notice what was happening, that in other people's minds evolutionary psychology had come 
to mean a much narrower branch of science, that not only was about the issues of evolution 
and psychology, but a particular theoretical framework […] So I've been in a bit of a 
dilemma, I don't want to abandon the term evolutionary psychology […] But it's become a bit 
of an albatross, because it now identifies you with a particular church within this field, many 
of whose ideas I don't actually hold with. (R10 – academic, sociobiology, psychology; 
popular author) 
 
Often this discussion was conducted in terms of there being ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ 
versions (often termed ‘churches’) of evolutionary psychology, with several actors, 
expressing the hope or belief that the publicly visible label could be co-opted by a 
broader movement of more varied approaches to evolution and humans.xxii  At other 
times, a more pragmatic boundary was drawn by assigning ‘sociobiology’ to the 
evolutionary study of animals, and ‘evolutionary psychology’ to the evolutionary study of 
humans.  
 
In spite, or perhaps because of all the distinctions made by academics, media 
professionals expressed quite different attitudes:   
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I don't think the majority; certainly the majority of the mainstream media really have the 
sophistication to distinguish between evolutionary psychology, social Darwinism, social 
biology, ordinary, in inverted commas, psychology.  I think all these things tend to be sort of 
bundled up together: when I do pieces or with the World Service do pieces, which touch 
evolutionary psychology, we do make the distinction […], but that distinction is not always 
clear, or is sometimes difficult to make. (R14 - radio producer, science broadcaster) 
 
Although most seemed aware of the stated differences between sociobiology and 
evolutionary psychology, they felt that such boundary attempts were at best difficult and 
at worst unimportant and unhelpful when trying to discuss evolution in media contexts.  
This is reflected in media coverage of the subject, where the term itself was sometimes 
avoided to concentrate instead on the specific issues at (for example, gender differences). 
So if these distinctions are not made in the public domain, then why is it important to 
understand them at all?  The label of ‘evolutionary psychology’ has quite clearly become 
a publicly recognized term, and one that has now largely eclipsed ‘sociobiology’, at least 
in UK press coverage  (Cassidy, 2005).  Therefore, the ability to own this label, to be 
identified with it in the public domain as well as in academia, is a powerful one, and 
something that actors in popular evolutionary psychology have vied to attain.   
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Natural and social sciences 
 
As I have described, the core-set of evolutionary psychologists tended to work in 
disciplines such as cognitive psychology or parts of philosophy; areas which are strongly 
oriented towards positivism and the natural sciences, particularly via subjects such as 
artificial intelligence.  However, these subjects are at present mostly located in social 
science, humanities, or perhaps in computer science departments, whereas researchers in 
‘broad’ evolutionary psychology work in a complex of disciplines around and in the 
biological sciences.  Many academics in these disciplines, who have been working in the 
area for many years, have an ambiguous relationship with evolutionary psychology, 
whereby they feel broadly allied to it through a shared commitment to evolutionary 
theory, but feel uncomfortable in being identified too closely with it.  At the same time, 
the mainstream of most social science disciplines, such as psychology or sociology, do 
not use biological or evolutionary ideas, and generally look to psychological, social, 
political and cultural explanations for understanding why people do the things that they 
do. For example, ideas about the social construction of gender stress the roles of 
upbringing, social norms and cultural experiences in creating modern systems of gender 
and sexuality, rather than evolutionary forces.  Another important area of difference can 
be seen in the current emphasis in the social sciences and humanities on the importance 
of differences and variations across cultures and historical periods, as opposed to EP’s 
interest in ‘human universals’.   This means that social scientists using evolutionary ideas 
have tended to be in a minority within their own disciplines, leaving many evolutionary 
psychologists in isolated or marginalized positions. An indication of this feeling can be 
seen in evolutionary psychologists’ frequent use of the following quotation, from 
philosopher of science Max Plank. 
A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the 
light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is 
familiar with it. (Planck, 1949; p33-34)  
 
This was quoted several times during interviews with evolutionary psychologists, as well 
as, for example, in discussions on a widely used mailing list, usually in the context of 
relations with other social scientists.xxiii  The implications here seem to be twofold: that it 
is not possible to convince their opponents of the rightness of their arguments; and that 
persuasion of students and younger scientists might prove more promising. 
 
During the 1970s, E. O. Wilson argued that Sociobiology provided the means for a 
‘scientific’ study of human behavior, in which the social sciences would ultimately be 
subsumed into the natural sciences (in the form of biology).xxiv  In response to these and 
similar ambitions, the sociologist Hilary Rose asks whether evolutionary psychology is 
“colonising the social sciences?”, and concludes that this is indeed the case (Rose, 2000).  
Although this seems a fairly accurate description of the ambitions of Wilson and many 
early sociobiologists, it does seem that evolutionary psychologists’ attitudes to social 
science may be more complex.  Sociobiology was and is practiced most often in the 
(biological) natural sciences, whilst a definite new feature of evolutionary psychology is 
its presence and origins in the social sciences, albeit positivist traditions within those 
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disciplines.  In The Adapted Mind (1992), an edited book laying out the basic premises of 
evolutionary psychology, EP is described as a ‘new paradigm’ for the social sciences, 
suggesting something a bit different from Wilson’s decidedly colonialist ambitions.  
Rather than subsuming the social sciences into biology, the intent seems to be to maintain 
the social sciences as separate disciplines for studying humans, but to instead transform 
how this is done.  Hence the mobilization of Kuhn’s (1962) imagery of ‘scientific 
revolutions’ and ‘paradigms’, which, in this context also fits well with the usage of Max 
Planck (adding the implication that evolutionary psychology can transform the social 
sciences from within).  In the first chapter of The Adapted Mind, Tooby and Cosmides set 
out a critique of what they described as the ‘Standard Social Science Model’ (SSSM) of 
studying how humans work.  They characterized this model as one ignorant of the role of 
biology and evolution in forming human minds, behavior and culture, thereby cutting off 
the social sciences from the natural sciences.  What emerges from the piece is less of an 
attack upon all social science per se, than a critique of interpretive and qualitative 
approaches to social and psychological research.  Experimental approaches, utilized more 
frequently in psychology, (especially cognitive psychology) and physical anthropology, 
are held up as better, more ‘scientific’ alternatives throughout the rest of the book 
(Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby, 1992).  This attack must be seen in the context of 
longstanding splits in the social sciences: roughly between interpretive and positivist 
research philosophies; and broadly corresponding divisions between quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies.  A very rough characterization of these positions might be that 
positivist approaches attempt to study humans in the same way as the rest of the natural 
world, using (largely) quantitative data and experimental methodologies. Interpretive 
approaches stress the importance of meaning and intention in humans’ thoughts and 
actions, arguing that we need to be studied in different ways to the natural world, with a 
greater emphasis on qualitative data and different methodologies such as interviewing, 
analysis of discourse and ethnography (Hughes, 1990; Malik, 2000).  
 
Such conflicts within the social sciences can be seen most sharply in anthropology, where 
physical anthropologists use quantitative measures of people and cultures, whilst most 
social anthropologists reject these approaches and instead investigate the particularities of 
contemporary human cultures, using participant-observation techniques and ethnography 
instead.  This split is perhaps one of the most severe in the social sciences, with the two 
groups rarely communicating, and controversy between the two becoming increasingly 
acrimonious.xxv  Interestingly, it is physical anthropologists such as John Tooby and 
Donald Symons who provide the most direct links between the (mostly) older 
sociobiology and (mostly) younger evolutionary psychology research communities.  
Parallel arguments have developed in the humanities, where newer, socially influenced 
perspectives on the history and philosophy of science are still strongly contested by 
traditional positivist philosophers of science; many of whom also work in philosophy of 
mind (closely aligned to cognitive psychology).xxvi  With this in mind, it is perhaps less 
surprising that there were also links between evolutionary psychology debates and the 
science wars in the UK: two of the most prominent ‘science warriors’ in the UK, Richard 
Dawkins and Lewis Wolpert, are both allied to evolutionary psychology.  A ‘science 
wars’ book was written by one of the few professors of evolutionary psychology in the 
UK (Dunbar, 1995); and the topic was frequently discussed on the evolutionary 
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psychology mailing list (which science warrior par excellence Paul Gross also subscribes 
and contributes to).  Finally, the last of the Darwin@LSE seminars in 1998 was a public 
debate between Alan Sokal and Bruno Latour.  Sociologist of science Ullica Segerstrale 
remarks upon this in her history of the sociobiology debates, arguing that the science 
wars were a struggle for ‘the cultural authority of science’ (Segerstrale, 2000; p340).xxvii  
This would concur with Thomas Gieryn’s conclusion that the science wars controversies 
were themselves episodes of boundary work, in which the traditional autonomy and 
authority of science were defended, whilst attacking the legitimacy of social scientists to 
be studying the content, practices and conclusions in the first place (Gieryn, 1999; 336-
62). 
 
Despite such conflicts, interpretive social scientists have not on the whole become very 
involved in public controversies over evolutionary psychology in the UK.  
Neurobiologists, geneticists and sociobiologists have all become involved, while those 
sociologists and interpretive psychologists acting in the public domain have largely been 
feminists, more directly concerned with the gender aspects of evolutionary psychology 
arguments. A possible exception to this might be Anthony Giddens, director of the LSE, 
and during the 1990s one of the most publicly visible sociologists in the UK, who has 
argued on his website for the need to defend the social sciences “against the current trend 
toward the natural sciences” (Giddens, 1999).  However, I have not come across any 
other public intervention from him on the subject, nor have I observed many other 
interpretive social scientists arguing against evolutionary psychology in popular forms or 
public spaces such as the mass media.  Considering the ferocity of evolutionary 
psychology’s attacks on the interpretive social sciences, this lack of visible response is 
curious, and should perhaps be a cause for concern in these subjects, especially in the 
light of opinions such as these: 
I think evolutionary psychology has a tremendous amount to offer to the social sciences, the 
old-fashioned social sciences, in fact I don't think they can do without it. I mean, basically 
sociology is terribly short of ideas, talk to Anthony Giddens or someone and try to find some 
interesting intellectual ideas there - it won't work, because there's nothing there. (R10 - 
academic, sociobiology, psychology; popular author) 
 
Giddens’ near solitary position as a ‘visible sociologist’ in the UK meant that he often 
became, by default, representative of all social sciences in this country.  As such, his 
political stance and close alignment with the Blair government is of particular concern 
considering natural science critiques of the social sciences as contentless and politically 
loaded.  An important part of the ‘turf wars’ being carried out around evolutionary 
psychology is, like many past disputes over evolution and humans, a conflict between the 
natural and social sciences.  However, unlike previous episodes such as the Sociobiology 
debate, this is also, very importantly, a conflict between two radically different visions 
of, and approaches to, the social sciences.  Evolutionary psychology’s version of social 
science is a positivist, scientific (or scientistic) one, and it is crucially engaged in an 
attempt to convert both internal and external understandings of the social sciences to 
match that vision.   
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Evolutionary Psychology as ‘Science’ 
 
Finally, evolutionary psychology often breaches the boundaries generally drawn around 
science, separating it from the rest of society, as described above in the work of Turner, 
Gieryn and Bucchi.  This has happened in two important, but really quite different ways.  
Firstly, evolutionary psychology’s subject matter (studying humans) brings it intrinsically 
closer to the non-scientific worlds of politics and everyday knowledge about people.  
Secondly, the movement of evolutionary psychology debates into the public domain has 
brought with it the attendant risks faced by any scientist undertaking popular work: that 
they will lose credibility in the academic domain.  This wobbly line, between academic 
and popular science, is one that both evolutionary psychologists and their opponents have 
walked during the course of the debate.  
 
If, as Donna Haraway (1986) has argued, “primatology is politics by other means” 
because the scientific study of apes and monkeys so often becomes an allegory for human 
politics and society, then surely evolutionary psychology, the scientific study of humans, 
must run the risk of being seen as ‘simply politics’?  Indeed, the evolutionary psychology 
claims which have received the most public attention have on the whole been intensely 
political ones, albeit not in the conventional sense of ‘party politics’. Claims about the 
nature of heterosexual desire and gender differences; the root causes of child abuse; and 
the origins of the ‘glass ceiling’ are all inherently political.  This is especially true when 
they are presented as speaking to policy and policymakers, as happened when 
Darwin@LSE launched its program in a joint publication with the UK liberal/left 
thinktank Demos.xxviii  Such proximity to the political arena has given rise to one of the 
most important criticisms of evolutionary psychology (also at stake in previous 
controversies about biology and humans), that such science is biased towards, or can 
provide scientific justifications for particular political agendas.  An important distancing 
tactic and counterargument used by evolutionary psychologists is the invocation of a 
philosophical principle known as the ‘naturalistic fallacy’.  This principle, originating in 
the arguments of David Hume and G.E. Moore, argues that it is a mistake to infer an 
‘ought’ statement (of how a particular situation should be) from an ‘is’ statement (of how 
things actually are) (Radcliffe Richards, 2000; p230).  Following this, evolutionary 
psychologists argue that their science merely investigates the ‘is’ of human nature, and 
says nothing about the ‘ought’ – i.e. political or moral arguments about how people 
should live.  Such arguments help to demarcate between the claims that evolutionary 
psychologists make about people and the political implications of these claims, or the 
uses that others might make of them.xxix  It bolsters evolutionary psychology claims of 
making objective, scientific truths about human nature, and delegitimizes criticisms of 
evolutionary psychology made on political grounds (that EP is sexist, racist, and so on), 
by making critics guilty of committing this fallacy and of being motivated by politics or 
even ‘ideology’, rather than science or a concern for the ‘truth’. The naturalistic fallacy is 
often treated as if it is a law of nature, without any discussion on why it is a mistake to 
infer how things should be from a statement of how they are. However, within the 
evolutionary community, this principle is not universally accepted, most notably by E. O. 
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Wilson himself, who argues that all human endeavors, including politics and morality, 
should be derived from science (see Wilson, 1998; Segerstrale, 2000; ch.18).   
 
As well as constructing a demarcation between itself and the domain of politics in 
general, evolutionary psychology must distance itself from conservative politics in 
particular.  This is a particularly important part of the boundary work carried out between 
evolutionary psychology and sociobiology, because of the very strong impacts of earlier 
leftwing critiques of sociobiology ideas. Evolutionary psychologists have done this by 
associating themselves with liberal / left politics, particularly during the early New 
Labour (UK) and Clinton Democrat (US) era of the mid and late 1990s.  As well as their 
work with Demos during this period, a thinktank formed just prior to Labour’s election to 
power in 1997; a good example of this general strategy can be seen in the Darwinism 
Today publication A Darwinian Left, written by philosopher Peter Singer (1999).  
Similarly, several evolutionary psychologists have written of themselves as feminists, and 
argued that their ideas are compatible with feminism (see, e.g. Cronin, 1999).  Finally, 
evolutionary psychologists have had to create a boundary between themselves and 
evolutionary arguments about race in particular.  This is largely because of the long 
history of evolutionary thought about race, which continues into the present day with 
behavioral geneticists’ arguments about race and IQ, still visible in the public domain 
(Herrnstein and Murray, 1994).  Evolutionary psychologists argue that they are only 
interested in features which are ‘human universals’, not in individual or group 
differences, and so are not interested in race.  This position is underlined by their 
adoption of Dawkins’ (1976) arguments that evolutionary selection occurs at the genetic, 
rather than group level.  Some evolutionary psychologists even claim to be researching 
the evolutionary underpinnings of racism itself, in order to help combat it (Kurzban, 
Tooby and Cosmides, 2001).  As with the use of the naturalistic fallacy, this boundary is 
also squishy on  
 
The movement of the evolutionary psychology debate so strongly into the public domain 
has also meant that participants have had to negotiate the fine line between legitimate 
‘popularization’ and less legitimate publicity seeking, sensationalism, egoism and so on, 
as lampooned in the Evolutionary War cartoon discussed at the beginning of this article.  
In recent years there have been significant shifts, especially in the UK, in the location of 
this boundary with government, funding bodies and scientific institutions all offering 
advice, support and incentives for scientists to communicate their work in the public 
domain. The popular science boom of the 1990s has also made it much more respectable 
for scientists to engage in popular communication.  Such shifts can also be seen in 
exemplary events, such as the election of Richard Dawkins as a Fellow of the UK’s 
Royal Society in 2001, ‘for his work on evolution and for raising the public 
understanding of science’ (Royal Society, 2001). Although the space for legitimate 
popular science is probably far bigger today than it has been for many years, scientists do 
still need to protect their domain of expertise, often by using popular science itself as a 
tool to do this (e.g. Mellor, 2003).  There are still potential risks for scientists in 
undertaking popular communication, as described by this senior academic: 
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So it can be a mistake for academics to think they can do what John Brockman says they can 
do, which is go directly to the public with their ideas  […]  It can be a mistake for scientists to 
do this and I think it can particularly be a mistake for young scientists, to do this.  They see 
the grand examples of the Pinkers and the Dawkins and think, ‘I can do that’, and they’re 
going to find that that may be the end of their career.  You still have to earn your brownie 
points by publishing in the right journals and doing the right things. (R10 - academic, 
sociobiology, psychology; popular author) xxx 
 
Overenthusiastic, excessive or premature (in terms of the science or of the career of the 
scientist) popular discussions of science can still be seen as illegitimate, especially from 
within the academic arena.  This meant that rhetorical manipulation of the category 
‘popular science’ occurred throughout evolutionary psychology debates, despite the 
obvious influence of popular books in the area.  For example, in this review of Alas Poor 
Darwin (2000), evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller critiques the book for focusing 
only on the ‘popularized’ version of evolutionary psychology while ignoring the ‘real 
science’ in academia: 
The “evolutionary psychology” castigated here is not the modern science of human nature as 
it is actually developing, but a simplified, out-dated, third hand version that focuses too much 
on the writings of the field’s best known popularisers such as Steven Pinker, David Buss, 
Matt Ridley and Dan Dennett. (Miller, 2000b) 
 
However, when doing popular work, those aspects of evolutionary psychology seen as 
most relevant to people’s everyday lives must be further emphasized in order to boost the 
subject’s popular appeal.  Therefore, evolutionary psychology’s problematic boundaries 
between science, politics and everyday knowledge must be pushed even further by the 
move into the public domain.  When discussing popular evolutionary psychology, both 
academics and media professionals felt the need to draw a line between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
popular science, by putting forward examples that, for them, fell outside the boundaries 
of legitimacy.  
And there's all that rather dubious stuff about hip to waist ratios, which I have to say I find 
some of the least convincing of all this stuff, let alone Thornhill and whatsisname on rape, 
which is just kind of… [trails off].  And of course those people let the side down horribly; I 
was trying to tell X, that rape book was just... [again lost for words] And of course the media 
love that! Because it's so over the top, and explosive and all that, it's kind of the more sensible 
you are the less interested they are in you.  (R13 - nonfiction publishing editor)xxxi 
 
Importantly, this also shows how scientific boundary work is carried out not only by 
scientists and scientific institutions, but also by and in the interests of actors throughout 
society.   
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4. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Since the early 1990s, evolutionary psychology has challenged, reconstituted or 
reinforced boundaries within and around the sciences at almost every level: in the 
complex disciplinary ecology around studies of evolution and humans; within the social 
sciences; at their interface with the natural sciences; and at the demarcations made 
between science and the rest of society.  At the same time, evolutionary psychologists 
have made concerted efforts to make their arguments in the public domain of the UK 
media, through writing popular books and press articles, giving public lectures, and 
appearing on television and radio programs.  This has also happened with academics and 
others who disagree with evolutionary psychology claims, creating a public controversy 
which continued through the late 1990s and early 2000s.  Crucially, the evolutionary 
psychology controversy has been a highly interdisciplinary one, involving academics and 
writers from across the natural sciences, social science and humanities.   
 
As I described earlier, a growing body of research in sociology and history of science has 
traced links between discussions of science in the public domain, the establishment of 
legitimacy for research activities, and the boundary work carried out within and around 
the sciences.  However, to simply outline the co-incidence of interdisciplinary conflict 
and public discussion in the case of evolutionary psychology is not really sufficient to 
make the case that they are linked.  As I described earlier, other factors, such as the 
relevance of evolutionary psychology arguments to everyday life and to contemporary 
political issues, have probably also contributed to pulling the subject into the public 
domain of the mass media, and I will be exploring these suggestions in my ongoing work.  
However, one thing that boundary work and public science do have in common is 
audiences: the people evolutionary psychologists and their opponents were attempting to 
convince in making their arguments.  As Massimiano Bucchi has argued, in cases of 
deviation, ‘popular science’ is often not exclusively aimed at the wider ‘public’ at all, 
citing the cold fusion case as a prime example of this: 
In such a case one could even argue that, just as happens for a certain form of political 
discourse, scientists’ discourse at the public level is only apparently ‘public’: communication 
at this level is not actually meant to address the public, but to send ‘coded messages’ to 
colleagues without having to conform to the constraints of specialist communication. 
(Bucchi, 1996; p380) 
 
Although this study can say nothing about the actual audiences or publics of popular 
evolutionary psychology, it has been possible to investigate what the intended audiences 
were: the social worlds that actors in popular evolutionary psychology were attempting to 
reach.  In the UK, coverage of evolutionary psychology was not spread evenly across the 
entire mass media, but was instead largely concentrated in specific sites, such as the 
broadsheet press, news magazines, and upmarket broadcasting sites with elite audiences, 
such as Channel 4 and Radio 4 (Cassidy, 2005).  When asked who they believed the 
audiences for popular evolutionary psychology were, both academics and media 
professionals gave an initial response that they had no idea what or who the audiences for 
EP were. However, many would continue by discussing their intuitions of who they 
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thought or hoped that they were talking with.  For academics, publishers and journalists 
alike, the most frequently mentioned audience was an elite, professional educated one, 
and invariably the idea of academics and scientists as audiences was seen as extremely 
important: 
So that’s why the other academics read these books: if you ring up, if I ring up any of my 
academic colleagues, prominent academics, the first thing we'll talk on the phone is, ‘have 
you read the new book by Matt Ridley, or Mark Ridley?’ or, ‘have you read the latest book 
by Brian Greene?’, or ‘what's Richard Dawkins’ latest book like?’   Academics are reading 
those books, so that’s where the debate is happening.   (R6 - academic, evolutionary 
psychology; popular author) 
 
Furthermore, popular authors described how, for them, popular writing could be helpful 
for their work in other ways, recalling the way in which Ulrike Felt (2000) has described 
the public domain as a creative space for scientists, in which they can develop ideas in a 
more speculative fashion than is allowable in academic journal publications. 
But when I do popular science writing, I write with a popular science hat on, and to some 
extent, they’re much more relaxed and I don't claim that the research underpinning them is 
meticulous, and I don't intend it to be.  So something like [book title], I wrote it in three 
months.  Now that was written kind of because it was fun to do, and it was an interesting 
story to talk about, but also in the process I was kind of trying to pull a whole load of 
disparate ideas together in my own mind, all these things I'd been doing, trying to make sense 
of them, and academically that's what that book did, but it was really written to entertain.   
(R5 – academic, behavioural ecology, evolutionary psychology; popular author) 
 
Therefore, UK actors in popular evolutionary psychology themselves understood it to be 
a public scientific debate, one which could not occur in academia for a number of 
reasons.  As well as the fact that both the content of and participants in this debate cut 
completely across pre-existing disciplinary structures in academia, the theoretical and at 
times speculative nature of evolutionary psychology was also a significant barrier to 
academic discussion of the subject.   
 
‘Evolutionary psychology’ was initially a term used by a distinct group of (largely US 
based) academics emerging from the sociobiology community in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.  Unlike their predecessors, who were largely located in the biological natural 
science disciplines, these researchers worked in social science subjects such as cognitive 
psychology, and argued for a distinctive approach: a ‘new paradigm’, for both the social 
sciences and for evolutionary studies of humans.  The use of ‘evolutionary psychology’ 
as a label signalled both this distance from previous approaches, and its location in the 
social sciences, whilst at the same time arguing strongly against other approaches within 
the social sciences.    A rapid move into the public domain, through popular science 
books and public lectures, enabled them to develop their ideas and reach new allies in the 
UK and in their own and other disciplines, at a stage when there was relatively little 
academic discussion of the subject (Cassidy, 2005).  These allies, particularly members 
of the Darwin@LSE group in the UK, then continued to communicate in the public 
domain, not only by producing more popular science and developing their ideas in this 
space, but also by networking between a diverse group of academics and media 
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professionals, including journalists and publishers.  Following this, a number of 
academics and writers, working from a range of disciplines also mobilised in the public 
domain, for a variety of reasons, including protection of their own subject, disagreement 
with the specific approach taken by evolutionary psychologists, or political objections to 
the claims being made. This resulted in an atmosphere of debate in media such as the 
press and popular science books, but also a wider recognition of the term.  In recent 
years, it seems that there has been a broadening of the meaning of ‘evolutionary 
psychology’, to encompass most contemporary evolutionary approaches to studying 
humans.  This means that, although initial moves into the public domain have been 
successful in creating evolutionary psychology as a label that is widely recognised by 
academics, media professionals and perhaps wider publics, the meaning of that label has 
shifted and continues to do so, changing and developing over time.  
 
Evolutionary psychology, as it appeared in the public domain of the UK, appears to be a 
good example of Bucchi’s (1996) ‘deviation processes’ in science communication.  Such 
processes are not necessarily ‘deviant’ as such, but do not occur on a regular basis, and 
when they do, it is usually under specific circumstances.  As this and my previous paper 
have shown, evolutionary psychologists moved into the UK media, putting their 
arguments directly in the form of popular science books, newspaper articles, book 
reviews, public lectures, and broadcast appearances.  In the early 1990s, evolutionary 
psychology was a new approach to the evolutionary study of humans, positioning itself as 
distinct from forerunners such as Sociobiology, through its theoretical approach, 
empirical methodologies, and locations in the social sciences and humanities. As I have 
described here, evolutionary psychology contested scientific boundaries at almost every 
level, from the immediate ‘disciplinary ecology’ surrounding it, right up to the traditional 
distinctions made between science and ‘non-science’ (by moving so actively into the 
public domain).  For similar reasons to the evolutionary psychologists’, academics and 
authors with other positions also moved into the public domain to contest evolutionary 
psychology claims and boundary definitions.  Unlike examples such as cold fusion, 
evolutionary psychologists initially published their work in academic fora, on a small 
scale, but then used mass media and popular science forms to reach broader, 
multidisciplinary audiences. This process is particularly evident in citation rates for some 
popular books, the rise in academic citations subsequent to media coverage of the subject, 
and the interview discussions quoted here.  Interestingly, evolutionary psychology 
textbooks have only started to appear in recent years (e.g. Barrett, Dunbar and Lycett, 
2001), signifying a degree of academic maturity which did not exist in the previous 
decade.   As this paper has shown, both academics and media professionals involved with 
popular evolutionary psychology in the UK themselves had a very good understanding of 
these processes, grounded in their own experiences and intentions of doing popular 
science.   
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Notes 
                                                 
i I would see this shift into ‘the public domain’ of the mass media to be very much in the vein of a move 
towards acting in Habermas’ modern ‘public sphere’ (Habermas, 1992). 
ii New Scientist and Scientific American are very well known examples of popular science media.  In a 
similar vein, Annals of Improbable Research (AIR) is a US based science humour magazine with a 
prominent web presence, see http://www.improbable.com/ for further details.  In addition, the genre of popular 
science books can be seen similarly as science books with a shared audience of academics and ‘interested 
lay’ readers.  
iii See also Brooks (1998, p51) for similar use of this metaphor in discussion of a public spat between 
Stephen Jay Gould and evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker (see Dennet, 1997; Gould, 1997a; 1997b; 
Pinker, 1997 for further details). 
iv To give a sense of scale, Hawking’s A Brief History of Time has only 7 citations in the ISI’s Web of 
Science database, whereas Dawkins’s Selfish Gene, now over 25 years old, also a popular science classic, 
has over 1,500 in the past ten years alone, giving a strong indication of each book’s influence in academia.  
v Interview sources are cited with respondent (R) number, occupation and academic subject where 
appropriate.  A total of twenty one semi-structured interviews were carried out over 1999 and 2000, twelve 
of which were with academics and nine with media professionals. 
vi I am very unsure that a ‘purely’ symmetrical approach is at all possible in such an analysis; however the 
process of attempting it has proved to be invaluable in carrying out this research. 
vii It would be very difficult to give a more accurate estimate because of the problems in defining what can 
count as an ‘evolutionary psychology’ book. 
viii In this text, I use ‘sociobiology’ to refer to the academic field of study by that name, including its 
modern forms; ‘Sociobiology’ denotes the original controversy of the 1970s surrounding the publication of 
Wilson’s book Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975). 
ix John Brockman is a publishing agent, who represents many of the most famous and successful popular 
science academic authors, including Richard Dawkins and Steven Rose.  He is particularly famous for 
securing some very large (six figure) advances from publishers for popular science books (see St. John, 
1999). 
x Examples of such trends within popular science publishing might include ‘religiously’ themed physics 
books, or popular science history. 
xi The choice of ‘Darwin@LSE’ as a title seems to reflect the group’s orientation towards modernism, 
science and technology, as well as the then dramatic rise of the Internet as a force in popular culture (see 
also their use of the lowercase the evolutionist as a title for an online magazine, and their links with John 
Brockman and Edge magazine, discussed below. See the Darwin@LSE website at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/cpnss/darwin/index.htm for further details. 
xii Interview, R6 – academic, evolutionary psychology; popular author 
xiii Darwin@LSE was originally funded by several charitable foundations and private sponsors, and the 
public programme eventually closed for a combination of financial and personal reasons, whilst ‘work in 
progress’ meetings and private research continues to be undertaken.  See: ‘Darwin@LSE: The story so 
far…’ at http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/cpnss/darwin/story.htm.  
xiv Media coverage of evolutionary topics in general is often linked with such ‘hooks’, particularly Darwin 
anniversaries, such as the date of his death, or publication of the Origin (Caudill, 1989). 
xv Although this ecological metaphor might be seen as potentially problematic in a study of relations 
between the natural and social sciences, it is widely used in social worlds research, and by no means 
implies that society operates in exactly the same way as an ecology.  Furthermore, it is worth noting that 
sociologists have used the ecological metaphor before, in the early part of the 20th century, and in particular 
used it to help open up a space for distinctly sociological enquiry, rather than allowing it to be reabsorbed 
into the natural sciences (Gaziano, 1996). 
xvi For the record, I have an undergraduate training in psychology and zoology (largely carried out prior to 
evolutionary psychology’s establishment in its current form); but a postgraduate training in sociology and 
science studies.  I would consider myself to be a social researcher who uses a qualitative-interpretive 
research approach in conjunction with quantitative methodologies. 
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xvii See http://www.hbes.com/ and http://www.science.mcmaster.ca/psychology/ehb/ehb.htm for further 
details of these.  Evolution and Human Behaviour changed its name from Ethology and Sociobiology in 
1996. 
xviii Evolutionary Psychology’ (Buller, 1998) on the website A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind 
http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/ep.htm 
xix ‘What is Evolutionary Psychology?’ on the website Evolution’s Voyage by William A. Spriggs. 
http://www.evoyage.com/Whatis.html 
xx Interestingly, phrenology itself had enormous popular appeal and was also the subject of huge 
controversy in the public domain, as well as heavy boundary work during the nineteenth century (see 
Cooter, 1984; also Shapin, 1979). 
xxi The use of lowercase font for the evolutionist magazine was purposeful: see note 10 above.  
xxii Several textbooks recently published on evolutionary psychology have actually stressed precisely this 
theme of a ‘broad church’ coming together under the label, see, e.g. Barrett, Dunbar and Lycett (2001). 
xxiii This e-mail distribution list regularly posts details of new research and media reports relevant to EP, 
which are then commented on by list members, many of whom are academics working in the area  This list 
is available to members of the public, but by request only.  It has been running since 1999 and at the time 
of writing has a little over 3,500 members, largely in the US and UK.  For further information see 
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/evolutionary-psychology/ and http://human-nature.com/. 
xxiv Wilson has built upon and elaborated these ideas in his more recent work, Consilience (Wilson, 1998). 
xxv A good example of this would be the controversy in 2000 over a book, Darkness in El Dorado (Tierney, 
2000), alleging that physical anthropologist and sociobiologist Napoleon Chagnon engaged in widespread 
abuses of the Yanomamo Indians he studies.  These claims resulted in bitter disputes between physical and 
social anthropologists, including prominent evolutionary psychologists such as John Tooby (see his website 
http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/eldorado/) 
xxvi Several of the proponents of EP, such as Helena Cronin, Daniel Dennet, Janet Radcliffe Richards and 
Peter Singer are philosophers, while the Darwin@LSE program was located in the Centre for Philosophy of 
Natural and Social Science at the LSE 
xxvii These connections have also been noted by Hilary Rose in her discussions of EP (Rose, 2000), as well 
as by Malik (2000) and Collins (2000).   
xxviii See Curry, Cronin and Ashworth (1996); also Cronin and Curry, (2000) as another example of 
evolutionary psychology policy advice. 
xxix This is particularly crucial considering the way in which far right organisations have in the past 
embraced sociobiology to justify their views, and that the current leader of the BNP continues to do so with 
evolutionary psychology (see Toolis, 2000). 
xxx John Brockman’s ideas about the ‘Third Culture’: a public space for scientists to debate, have been very 
influential on some evolutionary psychologists (see Brockman 1995, and his website Edge, 
http://www.edge.org/).   
xxxi The hip-waist ratio work refers to research findings on men’s preferences for a particular kind of 
“curvy” female figure (e.g. Singh, 1993).  Thornhill and Palmer (2000) argue for the evolutionary origins 
of male-female rape.  
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